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Richard Sprague from
Gaeton Fonzi's
"The Last Investigation"
"...if he had it to do
over again, he would begin his investigation of the Kennedy assassination
by probing "Oswald's ties to the Central Intelligence Agency."
Philadelphia's Richard Sprague as the Committee's chief counsel.
Sprague had gotten national attention with his successful prosecution
of United Mine Workers President Tony Boyle for the murder of
UMW reformer Joseph Yablonski. In Philadelphia, where as First
Assistant District Attorney he had run up a record of 69 homicide
convictions out of 70 prosecutions, Sprague was known as tough,
tenacious and independent. There was absolutely no doubt in my
mind when I heard of Sprague's appointment that the Kennedy assassination
would finally get what it needed: a no-holds-barred, honest investigation.
Which just goes to show how ignorant of the ways of Washington
both Sprague and I were.
When he took the job, Sprague had done so with the stipulation
that he would have complete authority to hire his own staff and
run the investigation as he saw fit. He proposed setting up two
separate staffs, one for Kennedy and one foe King.
He insisted on handling both cases as if they were homicide
investigations.
In the annals of the John F. Kennedy assassination, it was
a novel approach. And, judging from the reaction of many Congressman,
it was a far too radical approach.
The key factors that drove Richard Sprague to resign as Chief
Counsel of the Assassinations Committee appeared, at the time,
to be apparent and on the surface. His proposed use of certain
investigative equipment, his demand for a expensive, unrestricted
investigation, his refusal to pay politics with Chairman Gonzalez
-- all were apparent grounds for the vociferous criticism which,
in the long run, was debilitating to the Committee's efforts to
get on with its job. However, after his resignation and a brief
respite from the turmoil of Washington, Sprague was able to view
his experience in a broader perspective.
Shortly after he returned from Acapulco, he was interviewed
by Robert Sam Anson of New Times magazine. Sprague admitted that,
with the barrages flying at him from all directions, he and the
staff had little time to actually investigate. By his reckoning,
he said, he spent "point zero one percent" of his time
examining the actual evidence. Yet, he
told Anson, if he had it to do over again, he would begin his
investigation of the Kennedy assassination by probing "Oswald's
ties to the Central Intelligence Agency."
Recently, I asked Sprague why he had come to that conclusion.
"Well," he said, "when I first thought about it
I decided that the House leadership really hadn't intended for
there to be an investigation. The Committee was set up to appease
the Black Caucus in an election year. I still believe that was
a factor. But when I looked back at what happened, it suddenly
became very clear that the problems began only after I ran up
against the CIA. That's when my troubles really started."
In the early months of the Committee's life, Sprague's critics
both in Congress and in the press were not only keeping him busy
dodging the shots, they were also demanding that the Committee
produce some sensational new evidence to justify its continuance.
Sprague, therefore, was forced to take some wild swings at what
appeared to be a few obvious targets. One area that very apparently
needed closer examination was the CIA's handling of the initial
investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
According to the information supplied to the Warren Commission
by the CIA, a man who identified himself as Lee Harvey Oswald
visited the Cuban consulate in Mexico City on September 27th,
1963. (That, by the way, the House Assassinations Committee would
later conflictingly conclude, was possibly one of the dates Oswald
appeared at Silvia Odio's door in Dallas.) The Agency told the
Commission that Oswald had been in Mexico City from September
26th to October 3rd. During the time, said the Agency, Oswald
made a number of visits to both the Cuban Embassy and the Russian
Embassy attempting to get an in-transit visa to Russia by way
of Cuba. The CIA also claimed that when Oswald visited the Russian
Embassy he spoke with a Soviet consul who was really a KGB intelligence
officer. It was later learned, however, that CIA headquarters
in Washington was not informed of the incident until October 9th,
and then told only that Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy
on October 1st. The CIA station in Mexico City told headquarters
that it had obtained a photograph of Oswald visited the Embassy
and described the man in the photo as approximately 35 years old,
six feet tall, with an athletic build, a balding top and receding
hairline.
When the Warren Commission asked the CIA for photos
of Oswald taken in Mexico City, the ones it produced depicted the man described
in the original teletype -- obviously not Oswald. Notified of
this discrepancy, the CIA said simply it had made a mistake and
that there were no photographs of Oswald taken in Mexico City.
It never identified the man in the photos. In fact, the CIA was
able to produce very little hard evidence regarding Oswald's activities
in Mexico City. "For example," Commission Counsel J.
Lee Ranking complained, "they had no record of Oswald's daily
movements while in Mexico City, nor could they confirm the date
of his departure or his mode of travels."
Some Warren Commission critics would later interpret the incident
as an attempt by certain CIA personnel to falsely link Oswald
to Communist connections even before the Kennedy assassination.
When Sprague first approached this area, he discovered that the
CIA officer in charge of reporting such information from Mexico
City at the time of Oswald's visit was former Bay of Pigs propaganda
chief David Atlee Phillips.
In the biography, The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service
(published in 1977), David Phillips spends just a few pages on
the Kennedy assassination and the Mexico City incident. He blames
the cable discrepancy on a mistake by an underling. He explains
the lack of an Oswald photography on the CIA's inability to maintain
camera coverage of the Cuban and Russian embassies on an around-the-clock
and weekend basis. A seemingly strange deficiency at a period
so close to the Cuban missile crisis)
Sprague called David Phillips to testify before the Assassinations
Committee in November, 1976. According to Sprague, Phillips said
that the CIA had monitored and tape recorded Oswald's conversations
with the Soviet Embassy. The tape was then transcribed by a CIA
employee who then mistakenly coupled it with a photograph of a
person who was not Oswald. Phillips said that the actual recording
was routinely destroyed or re-used about a week after it was received.
Sprague subsequently discovered an FBI memorandum to
the Secret Service dated November 23rd, 1963. It referred to the CIA notification
of the man who visited the Russian Embassy. The memo noted that
"Special Agents of this Bureau who have conversed with Oswald
in Dallas, Tex., have observed photographs of the individual referred
to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These
Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual
was not Lee Harvey Oswald."
Sprague was intrigued: How could the FBI agents have
listened to a tape recording in November when Phillips said it had been
destroyed in October? Sprague decided to push the CIA for an answer.
He wanted complete information about the CIA's operation in Mexico
City and total access to all its employees who may have had anything
to do with the photographs, tape recordings and transcripts. The
Agency balked. Sprague pushed harder. Finally the Agency agreed
that Sprague could have access to the information if he agreed
to sign a CIA Secrecy Agreement. Sprague refused. He contended
that would be in direct conflict with House Resolution 222 which
established the Assassination Committee and authorized it investigate
the agencies of the United States Government. "How,"
he asked, "can I possible sign an agreement with an agency
I'm supposed to be investigating?" He indicated he would
subpoena the CIA's records.
Shortly afterwards, the first attempt to get the Assassinations
Committee reconstituted was blocked.
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